



CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ANALYSIS

**DOES YOUR FACILITY'S
ACCIDENT HAVE A
JUSTIFIED BASIS?**

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OVERVIEW

- What is a Justified Basis?
- Regulatory Drivers
- Resources for Determining (Credible)
Accidents and Power Histories
- Data Application Example
- Conclusions



WHAT IS A JUSTIFIED BASIS?

- More than an “approved” or “authorized” handbook value
- CREDIBILITY - both in Likelihood and Consequence, i.e., data-based.
 - In spite of compliance with ANS-8.1, Section 4.1.2, Process Analysis:
 - *Before a new process it shall be determined that ... subcritical ... and credible abnormal conditions.*
 - Roll-up issues?



REGULATORY DRIVERS

- ANSI/ANS-8.23, Nuclear Criticality Accident Emergency Planning and Response, 5.1.1
 - *Potential criticality accident locations and predicted accident characteristics shall be evaluated and documented*
 - *This description may be based on professional judgment or a more detailed analysis.*
 - *The description should include the estimated fission yield.*
 - *The likelihood of recurrence should be considered*



REGULATORY DRIVERS

- ANSI/ANS-8.23, Nuclear Criticality Accident Emergency Planning and Response, 5.1.2
 - *An immediate evacuation zone shall be established based on the documented evaluation.*
 - *Emergency response planning shall shall establish a maximum acceptable value for the absorbed dose at the IEZ boundary.*
 - *The basis for the maximum acceptable value shall be documented.*



RESOURCES FOR DETERMINING ACCIDENT CREDIBILITY


- Process Supervisors and Operators
- Accident Reports (e.g., LA-13638)
- Analyses of actual and postulated accidents, such as the ICNC'91 review paper: *Criticality Accident Likelihoods, Consequences, and Emergency Planning* by T. P. McLaughlin



RESOURCES FOR DETERMINING POWER HISTORIES

- ANS-8.23 APPENDIX C
 - Accident simulation data: KEWB, CRAC, SILENE, SHEBA, TRACY
 - ORNL Slide Rule
 - Accident Report, LA-13638
 - DOE Handbook 3010-94, *Airborne Release Fractions/Rates for Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities*, Chapter 6
 - NUREG/CR-6410, *Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facility Accident Analysis Handbook*

CRITICALITY ACCIDENT SIMULATION DATA



Specific fissions in first spike vs reactor period

CRITICALITY ACCIDENT SIMULATION DATA





Fig. 5. Fission Rate and Integrated Fission Energy Release in CRAC 19 as a Function of Time.

CRITICALITY ACCIDENT SIMULATION DATA



Bounding fission density vs time, CRAC & SILENE



ORNL SLIDE RULE

- Based heavily on CRAC data
- Very easy to apply and has many additional features/capabilities
- Appears to have a reactivity insertion rate to the half power dependence that results in increasing conservatism at higher ramp rates compared to CRAC data, for the first spike yield.



DOE and NRC HANDBOOKS

- Little discussions of likelihoods with different media
- Recommended bounding total fissions only (with inadequate justification) - no breakdown into first spike and plateau (DOE)
- Describes hypothetical scenario from withdrawn RG's 3.33, 3.34, and 3.35:
 - $1.0+18$ in first spike followed by 47 pulses of $1.9+17$ at 10 minute intervals over 8 hours for $1.0+19$ total fissions. (NRC)



CONCLUSIONS -1

- Accident experience, augmented by common-sense reasoning, supports the contention that non-solution process criticality accidents are inherently much less likely than those that might occur in solution operations.
 - The INCN'91 paper examines this in some detail. Subsequent accident revelations reinforce this paper's conclusions.



CONCLUSIONS -2

- Given the negligible accident rate in non-solution media (one reported, with deliberate violations) it would seem difficult to justify emergency plans and procedures, including a CAAS, for operations with fissile material only in dry forms. This conclusion is based on both risk and cost issues.



CONCLUSIONS -3

- For operations with significant quantities of fissile materials in solution form, there is much relevant (accident simulation) data and more being generated. Practically all site- and process-specific criticality accident characterizations and evaluations should be able to be performed readily by the direct application of these data.