

# Statistical Noise for Criticality Safety Specialists

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# Noise = Nuisance (not information)

- Statistics are said to allow anything that the practitioner wants to show
- **Incorrect understanding helps**
- Statistics theory and conclusions are taken out of their original contexts
- **Long experience with criticality safety provides many examples**
- Three examples are presented now



# Outline

1. Correlation between calculated reactivities (could be measured)
2. Use of all available information sources to reduce uncertainties
3. Reliable statistical determination of zero observations



# 1. Reactivity correlation


- Correlation is not a complicated term
- **Correlation is not limited to statistics**
- The cause of a correlation should be understood to make it reliable
- **Reactivities (calculated or measured) can be correlated**
- Correlation of uncertainties is a safety problem (linear, not quadratic summation)



# $K_{\text{eff}}$ + reactivity additions

- Reference:  $k_{\text{eff},r} = 0.891 \pm 0.011$
- Perturbation 1:  $k_{\text{eff},1} = 0.892 \pm 0.012$
- Reactivity 1:  $\Delta k_{\text{eff},1} = 0.001 \pm 0.016$
- Perturbation 2:  $k_{\text{eff},2} = 0.893 \pm 0.012$
- Reactivity 2:  $\Delta k_{\text{eff},2} = 0.002 \pm 0.016$

# Large number of reactivities



Correct Reference value

## Two different correlation cases

- I: The sum of reactivities are added to the reference value to get the final value
- Total uncertainty:  $\sqrt{\Sigma(\sigma_i^2)}=0.025$ ? No!  
Two uncertainties are anti-correlated:  
 $k_{\text{eff}} = \underline{0.891} + (0.892 - \underline{0.891}) + (0.893 - 0.891)$
- Correlation I:  $\sqrt{(\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_2^2 + \sigma_r^2)} = 0.020$

Where  $\sqrt{(\dots)}$  is the square root of listed terms



## Correlation case II

- II: The sum of reactivities are added to a new calculation value  $0.894 \pm 0.011$  for final value
- Total uncertainty:  $\sqrt{\Sigma(\sigma_i^2)} = 0.025$ ? No!  
Two uncertainties are correlated:  
 $k_{\text{eff}} = 0.894 + (0.892 - \underline{0.891}) + (0.893 - \underline{0.891})$
- Correlation II:  $\sqrt{(\sigma_n^2 + \sigma_1^2 + \sigma_2^2 + (2\sigma_r)^2)} = 0.030$



# Simple equations without correlations

$$\rho_i = \frac{\Delta k_i}{k_i} = \frac{k_i - k_{ref,i}}{k_{ref,i}}$$

$$s_i^2 = \frac{u_i^2}{\delta x_i^2} \left[ \left( k_{\delta x_i} - k_{ref,i} \right)^2 \pm \left( s_{M,\delta x_i}^2 + s_{M,ref,i}^2 \right) \right]$$

$$\left( s_M \right)^2 = \sum_{i=1}^I \frac{u_i^2}{\delta x_i^2} \left[ \left( s_{M,\delta x_i}^2 + s_{M,ref,i}^2 \right) \right]$$

# Correlation of N uncertainties (sorted)

$$(s_M)^2 = \sum_{i=1}^I \frac{u_i^2}{\delta x_i^2} s_{M,\delta x_i}^2 + \sum_{i=N+1}^I \frac{u_i^2}{\delta x_i^2} s_{M,ref,i}^2 + \left( \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{u_i}{\delta x_i} \right)^2 s_{M,r}^2$$

- A single correlated uncertainty  $s_{M,r}$
- If more than one reference calculation, the last term is split to each group of correlations
- Make all  $u_i/\delta x_i = 1.000$  and all  $s_{M,\delta x_i}$ ,  $s_{M,ref,i}$  and  $s_{M,r}$  identical:  $s$  **Note:  $N \leq I$**

$$(s_M / s) = \sqrt{(2I - N) + N^2}$$

# Examples

I	N	$s_M/s$
8	0	4.0
8	5	6.0
8	8	8.5
32	0	8.0
32	16	17.4
32	32	32.5

# Part 1 - Conclusions

- In evaluations of critical experiments, and sometimes in safety evaluations, many uncertainties are covered
- A reasonable model for dealing with correlations reduces evaluation errors and supports efforts to minimize uncertainties
- Avoid reference value – Use upper and lower values with reference value to check linearity
- Large parameter variation reduces uncertainty

## 2. Statistical misunderstandings


- “A systematic effect can’t be reduced by additional observations”
  - “Systematic effects increase the uncertainty”
  - “Precision of uncertainty should not be higher than of the measured/calculated value”
  - “Don’t compare with other evaluations to avoid being influenced by them”
  - “Independent parameters -> independent reactivities”
- 

# Use all information and use it wisely

- Evaluated critical experiments are extremely valuable as benchmarks
- $K_{\text{eff}}$ , or other criticality parameters should be complemented with other measurements
- Quantity of benchmarks has unfortunately been emphasized rather than quality
- Combining two different perspectives can be extremely effective



# Different views help



## Part 2 - Conclusions

- Combination of information can reduce uncertainties and reveal outliers
- The ICSBEP Uncertainty Guide, though very good, needs further work
- **Statistical “truths” need further discussion**
- Systematic and random effects, correlations and other effects are not necessarily complicated



### 3. Statistical determination of zero

- MCNP warns you if a tally is zero
- I got no votes in the last election – I warn you
- What if zero (no observations) is correct?
- Monte Carlo, just as other statistical sampling methods, rely on representative sampling
- Non-zero tallies are often caused by including invalid observations (votes). Discard them!



# Spent fuel cask – Irradiated fuel

- The axial fuel composition varies strongly
- The central region often has low reactivity.
- Small region at fuel top dominates but bottom region almost as reactive
- A flat initial fission source generates many fissions near the bottom – Transient phase!
- Converged fission source -> No fissions
- Specialists claim zero fissions is a problem



# Zero is correct!

- Start tally with converged fission source.
- Normal case less than ten million neutrons.
- Run many more neutrons.
- If up to one billion neutrons are needed to produce a fission in a region, the normal case fissions are zero in that region.
- Non-zero fissions is evidence of transient phase influence.



# Zero is OK!

- An irradiated fuel assembly may be divided into 20 axial zones and several radial zones
- One suggested solution to avoid zero fissions is to modify the geometry and compositions
- Changed fuel assembly specifications require significant efforts and may not be safe in other scenarios
- Learn to recognize when the fissions in a region could correctly be zero.



## Part 3 - Conclusions

- A tally is not always requested because the result is interesting or important
- It is important to understand the results of a calculation
- In burnup credit, the axial peak (end effect) is probably well understood
- Zero fissions in a region in a converged calculation is not understood but often correct



# Summary

- Correlations need better treatment (between uncertainties, between benchmarks, etc.)
- Many statistical “truths” are misunderstood
- Zero observations (e.g. fission source in a region) can be determined statistically
- A certified criticality safety specialist should have 5 years experience at licensing authority to be trusted with safety responsibility



## Reflection 15: Burnup credit makes mixed array issue more realistic

- Fresh fuel assumption – Few assembly types
- Burnup credit make all assemblies different
- Lower reactivity for one fresh fuel type does not necessarily be the case for irradiated fuel
- Different geometry (e.g. 14x14 or 16x16) of fuel assemblies is a mixed array safety issue
- OECD/NEA exercise on “Large arrays” not complete; Fuel assemblies in water is easier.

