



#### Criticality Safety Refinement at the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility



James J. Bazley / Michael J. Shea / Robert G. Foster

Shaw AREVA MOX Services, LLC P.O. Box 7097, Aiken, SC 29804-7097





# What is the MOX Project?


- Mission
  - Convert 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium to mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for use in U.S. commercial power reactors
  - Once irradiated, plutonium will meet the spent fuel standard –making it as inaccessible and unattractive for use in weapons

#### • Impact

- Total lifetime cost \$4.8 billion plus \$200-300 million/year to operate
- Removes about 10,000 warheads from the nuclear arsenal
- Eliminates \$500 million/year in security costs
- Provides clean, carbon free energy that offsets over \$21 billion in imported oil costs at \$48/barrel (or \$60 billion at \$140/barrel)

FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY









# **Unique Aspects**

- DOE funded with DOE oversight
  BUT NRC licensed and regulated
- Weapon-Grade Pu versus Reactor-Grade
- DCP/HU Tables summarize NCSEs instead of NUREG-1718/1520-type Risk Scoring
- Highly automated process
  - 40,000 Control Inputs/Outputs
  - 80 non-safety PLCs
  - 36 safety PLCs





### **Timeline Overview**

- March 1999 MOX Contract Awarded
- February 2001 Construction Authorization Request Submitted
- March 2005 NRC Issues Construction Authorization
- September 2006 License Application and Integrated Safety Analysis Summary Submitted
- August 2007 Construction Starts
- March 2009 Response to NRC's First Round of Request for Additional Information
- December 2010 NRC to complete SER and issue License
- June 2015 Cold Start-Up
- September 2016 Hot Start-Up



#### September128,02008



National Nuclear Security Administration







### **Construction Statistics** (as of May 31, 2008)

- Office Space
  - Completed
  - In Process
- Concrete
  - Structural
  - Unreinforced
- Rebar
- Embedded Plates
- Conduit
- Cable tray

- (of 600,000 square feet) 262,500 square feet 78,000 square feet
- 51,434 cubic yards (of 170,000) 47,238 cubic yards (of 55,800)
- 9,697 tons (of 35,000 tons)

1,523

- 10,331 plates
- ~0 (of 500,000 linear feet)
- ~0 (of 47,000 linear feet)
- Power/control cable ~0 (of 3,000,000 linear feet)
- Process piping limited (of >80 miles)
- MOX Project Employment






## **Current MOX Challenges**

- Finding NQA-1 Vendors
- Obtaining Commercial Grade Dedication of non-NQA-1 Vendor Equipment
- Graded Approach to IROFS in identifying Safety Function
- Workforce Revival
  - Revival of Manufacturing Base
  - Finding expertise (replacing retiring workforce)
  - Developing off-site training to build pool of qualified individuals for operations





### **NCS Approach and Products**



- Established Validation (5 AOAs in 3 reports with NRC concurrence)
- Established ~100 separate Nuclear Criticality Safety Calculations
- Generated 48 separate NCSEs that
  - Identify Criticality Safety Controlled Parameters
  - Establish Controls on Credible Events
    - Inherently Highly Unlikely Event Controls
    - Double Contingency Events
      - Explicitly show two legs of DCP
      - Provide additional control properties (Redundancy/Diversity/Margin/Fail ure Detection)
  - Demonstration that likelihood of all credible events is "Highly Unlikely"





Actual Cell

(Before Tank Placement)





# **NCS Program & NCSE Evolution**

- NCS Staffing
  - Originally near 100% French
  - Augmented mix of American and French expertise
  - Transitioning to In-plant base
  - Growing new NCS Engineers
- QA/QC inspection of NCS-controlled equipment leads to
  - dealing with contract/equip changes
  - dealing with non-conformances
- Continuous improvement of NCSEs to facilitate
  - improving safety function declaration through increased equipment detail knowledge





# **NCS Challenges in Construction**

- Application of a graded approach to quality level selection of subcomponents
  - gaskets and seals in powder QL-1 configuration-controlled components can be non-QL-1 and leak small gram quantities
  - certain structural subcomponents which do not contribute to structural and configuration-control qualification can be non-QL-1
- Commercial grade dedication when NQA-1 supplier not available
- Actual fabrication capabilities do not match idealized/modeled design and NCS calculations
  - Annular tank slight out of roundness accounted for in wall thickness tolerances
  - Cd poison sheets not continuous but rather separate sheets held in place by welding between SS covers resulting in unpoisoned dimples
  - Welding poison panels on slab tanks cause slight bulging, now accounted for in wall thickness tolerances













#### **Construction Continues...**







