

NRC Regulatory Perspective on Criticality Safety in Fissile Material Transportation and Spent Fuel Storage

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Overview



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- Background
- Regulations and Guidance
- Criticality Validation Issues
- Draft Validation Guidance
- Part 71 Rulemaking
- Conclusion

Background



Division of Spent Fuel Management:

- Within the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS)
- Transportation of Radioactive Material – 10 CFR Part 71
- Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel 10 CFR Part 72





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Background



Division of Spent Fuel Management

- ~70 staff, including 11 dedicated to shielding and criticality analysis (Criticality, Shielding, and Risk Assessment Branch)
- Handle around 80-100 licensing actions per year
 - General and site-specific Part 72 licenses
 - Type B and AF transportation package designs

Regulations



Transportation:

- §71.55 single package subcritical
- §71.59 arrays of packages subcritical; determine Criticality Safety Index for accumulation control

Storage:

- §72.124 subcritical under normal, off-normal, and hypothetical accident conditions
 - Double contingency
 - Favorable geometry and/or fixed neutron absorbers
 - Criticality monitoring

Guidance




- Standard Review Plans (NUREGs-1536, -1567, -1609, and -1617)
- NUREG/CR-5661, Recommendations for Preparing the Criticality Safety Evaluation of Transportation Packages
- NUREG/CR-6361, Criticality Benchmark Guide for Light Water Reactor Fuel in Transportation and Storage Packages
- NUREG/CR-6698, Guide for Validation of Nuclear Criticality Safety Calculational Methodology
- Burnup Credit:
 - NUREG/CR-7108 Isotopic depletion
 - NUREG/CR-7109 Criticality

Fuel Reconfiguration




Fresh Fuel Drop Test

NUREG/CR-7203: A Quantitative Impact Assessment of Hypothetical Spent Fuel Reconfiguration in Spent Fuel Storage Casks and Transportation Packages



Uniform Pitch Expansion



Non- Uniform Pitch Expansion

>5.0 Weight Percent



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Code Validation:

0% 5	%	20% 9	3% 10 J	00%
LEU powder / pellet packages, UF_6 , $UO_2(NO_3)_2$, fresh fuel assemblies, spent fuel assemblies	Longer irradiation cycles, ATF Advanced reactor fuel (MSR, SFR, HTGR)	Research reactor fuel, fresh or spent (TRIGA, MTR, etc.)	Some research reactor fuel, fresh or spent, HEU powder / pellet / metal packages	
Spent Fuel Marine Contract of the second sec				

Part 71/72 Interface



High-Capacity PWR Cask Criticality Safety Criteria:

Storage:

- <5.0% Initial enrichment
- Minimum soluble boron during loading






Transportation:

- <5.0% Initial enrichment</p>
- >45 GWd/MTU burnup
- Cooling time
- Limits on irradiation parameters:
 - Soluble boron
 - Specific power
 - Moderator temp.
 - Fuel temp.

Neutron Absorber Credit U.S.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment



75% Credit for large B_4C particle absorber plates, which may have streaming-type effects

90% Credit uniform absorber plates, with comprehensive fabrication testing – 10% retained to cover lack of validation for highly loaded absorbers

NUREG/CR-6845: Sensitivity Analysis Applied to the Validation of the ¹⁰B Capture Reaction in Nuclear Fuel Casks – 2004

- Used S/U methods to determine applicability of existing ¹⁰B experiments to validate highly loaded panels
- Mature codes, new data reevaluate?

Draft Validation NUREG/CR



- Consolidate and update previous validation guidance
 - Experiment selection
 - Trending analysis
 - Applicability of validation to safety analysis
 - Extrapolation of bias and uncertainty
 - Identification of validation gaps and weaknesses
 - Documentation
- Provide additional guidance
 - Use of trending analysis results
 - Acceptable confidence levels for normality/trending
 - Handling of validation gaps and weaknesses
 - Use of S/U and other new methods
 - Potential impact of correlated experiments

10 CFR Part 71 Rulemaking



Harmonization with IAEA SSR-6 (2012, 2018) – expected final rule in 2021

- 10 CFR 71.15 Exemptions from classification as fissile material
- 10 CFR 71.22 and 71.23 Fissile material general licenses
- Coordinated with DOT
- Issues Paper 11/15/2016: ADAMS ML16299A298

Conclusions



- Number of criticality safety issues in fissile material transportation and storage
- Many of them can be potentially solved or mitigated with new codes, data, and modeling techniques
- New validation guidance forthcoming
- Transportation rulemaking upcoming looking for stakeholder engagement