



Qualification of Y-12 Legacy Criticality Accident Alarm System Detectors

Chris Haught, Troy McMillen, Chris Woodrow

# Outline

- Configuration of Y-12 Legacy CAAS
- Historic Qualification and Range of Coverage
- Qualification Testing with Godiva
- Conclusions

# Legacy CAAS Configuration


- Gamma sensitive NMC GA-6 detectors
  - Plastic scintillators
  - PMTs
  - 30 +2/-5 mR/hr setpoint
  - Light source creates ~1 mR/hr artificial background
- Detector states
  - Normal
  - "Fail" (< ~0.1 mR/hr)
  - "Hi Rad" (above setpoint)
- CAAS Station
  - 2 detectors
  - Control relay circuit
  - Alarms on 2 "Hi Rad" signals
- Accident Coverage
  - Generic 400-ft range of coverage
  - "Overlapping" coverage required



400-foot range of coverage for each station

All fissile material areas within the range of at least 2 stations


Each CAAS station <sup>\*</sup> has 2 detectors



400-foot range of coverage for each station

Each CAAS station \* has 2 detectors

Postulated **\*** criticality accident




400-foot range of Accident seen coverage for each by 2 stations station Each CAAS station 😫 has 2 detectors 44 Postulated 🗰 criticality accident

400-foot range of coverage for each station

Each CAAS station \* has 2 detectors

Postulated **\*** criticality accident



Accident seen by 2 stations

### **Historic CAAS Detector Qualification and Maintenance**

#### History of pulse reactor testing dating back to 1950s

- Configurations involving shielding materials to test range of accident coverage
- Detector Qualification (ANSI/ANS-8.3)
  - Minimum accident of concern (20 rad/m @ 2 m or alternate)
  - Response to minimum duration transient (1 ms)
  - Tolerance to maximum radiation (10 rad/s)
- Detector qualification criteria from 1980s
  - 10<sup>15</sup> fissions 800 feet from detector (distant pulse test)
  - 10<sup>17</sup> fissions 14 feet from detector (intense pulse test)
  - Required for every detector

### **Historic CAAS Detector Qualification and Maintenance**

- Detector checks
  - "Fail" indicator monitoring
  - Periodic visual checks
  - Periodic source checks
- Detectors require periodic calibration due to setpoint drift
  - Y-12 maintains an onsite calibration facility
  - Detectors periodically removed from service and replaced with ones recently calibrated
  - Removed detectors are recalibrated and queued reuse

Y-12 has used hand calculation methods to estimate range of coverage

 $\dot{D}(r) = \frac{\dot{S_o}R}{4\pi r^2} Be^{-\mu r}$   $\dot{D}(r)$  is the detector setpoint

- Only accounts for primary gammas and buildup (B)
- For a sustained source equivalent to 20 rad/min at 2 m:

$$\dot{D}(r) = \left(\frac{D_{\gamma}}{D_{\gamma+n}}\right) (20 \ rad/min) \left(\frac{2 \ m}{r}\right)^2 B e^{-\mu r} \longleftarrow$$

• For a rapid transient source equivalent to 20 rad at 2 m:

$$\dot{D}(r) = \left(\frac{D_{\gamma}}{D_{\gamma+n}}\right) \left(\frac{20 \ rad}{pulse \ width}\right) \left(\frac{2 \ m}{r}\right)^2 \varepsilon B e^{-\mu r} \quad \checkmark$$

ε is the detector sensitivity to a rapid transient

Methodologies in ANSI/ANS-8.3, Appendix B

#### **Detector Sensitivity Estimates**

- 1967 experiments using HPRR bursts
  - 7×10<sup>14</sup> fissions to 1×10<sup>17</sup> fissions
- NMC detectors at 1,000 feet from reactor
- Algorithm to estimate gamma dose rate @ 1,000 ft
  - Measured: pulse width and fissions (from  $\Delta T$ )
  - Previously determined: gamma dose rate @ 1,000 ft per kW (steady-sate measurements)
- Detector response estimated
  - Detector trip at different setpoints
  - Observations of the detector meter

#### **Detector Sensitivity Estimates**

Fissions	FWHM (ms)	Setpoint (mR/hr)	3
7.13×10 <sup>14</sup>	1.0	50 (trip); 500 (no trip)	$\frac{50 \ mR/hr}{9.51 \times 10^4 m rem/hr} = \frac{1}{1900}$
9.66×10 <sup>15</sup>	1.0	50, 300, 500, 750 (all tripped)	$\frac{750 \ mR/hr}{1.29 \times 10^6 mrem/hr} = \frac{1}{1700}$
2.33×10 <sup>16</sup>	0.75	550 (recorder trace and calibration)	$\frac{550 \ mR/hr}{3.07 \times 10^6 mrem/hr} = \frac{1}{5600}$

- Less sensitive for high-energy burst, but interest is on the low end
- Concludes that 1/2500 is a conservative value to use
  - Included in ANSI N16.2-1969, Appendix A
  - Documented as Y/DD-113 in 1974 by E.C. Crume
  - Included in ANSI/ANS-8.3-1997, Appendix B


**Effect of Shielding from Walls** 

$$\dot{D}(r) = \left(\frac{D_{\gamma}}{D_{\gamma+n}}\right) \left(\frac{20 \, rad}{pulse \, width}\right) \left(\frac{2 \, m}{r}\right)^2 \varepsilon B e^{-\mu_{air} r_{air} - \mu_{shield} r_{shield}}$$


 $B = min[B_{air} + B_{shield}, B_{air} \times B_{shield}]$ 

- Done for 10 discrete prompt gamma groups, total dose rate is the sum of all groups
- New estimate for detector sensitivity using above formulation and data from 1989 Godiva test

Fissions	FWHM (ms)	Detector Location	Setpoint (mR/hr)	Gamma Dose @ 2m (rad)
2.85×10 <sup>14</sup>	4.0	1600 ft.	25 (trip)	1.5 (derived)



- Sustained source (steady-state) is the most conservative
- At 120 m (400 feet), max shielding is 0.3 m (~12 in)



Distance from assembly to detector air (m)

Sustained source (steady-state) is the most conservative

• At 120 m (400 feet), max shielding is 3 hollow-clay tile walls

# Y-12 CAAS Post 1990s

- DOE no longer has an operational fast pulse reactor (until circa ~2010)
- New detectors purchased in 2005
- New PMTs purchased in 2016
- Detector qualification only involves passing calibration process
  - Setpoint equivalent to radiation level at 400 feet from a 20 rad/min @ 2m source (shielding from 3 hollow clay tile walls or 12 inches of concrete)
  - Lacking qualification for maximum radiation and minimum pulse width

# Godiva IV Testing, July 2017

- Subject "sample" of detectors to an intense pulse at close range
  - Maximum expected radiation
  - Minimum pulse width
- 6 detectors initially tested in 2017
  - 2 new detectors
  - 4 existing detectors with new PMTs
- Data Logging
  - Data logger in control room
  - Output voltage from each detector connected to data logger
  - Contact closure signal from each detector connected to data logger
  - Signal from reactor shutdown acquired to record time of burst

# Godiva IV Testing, July 2017

Burst #	Reactivity (¢ above	Burst Temp.	Fission Yield (x10 <sup>16</sup> fissions)	Pulse Width	Total Absorbed Air Dose* and Dose Rate at 2 m from Godiva IV		e and Dose Rate at 2 m from Godiya IV	CAAS Alarm Response <sup>¥</sup>
	prompt)	(Δ <b>T</b> °C)		FWHM <sup>§</sup> (µsec)	Dose (Rad)	Dose Rate <sup>§</sup> (MRad/s)		
2025	0.8	47.5	0.63	970	28 (14 n + 14 γ)	.017	Immediate	
2026	3.0	71.8	0.95	310	42 (20 n + 22 γ)	0.10	Immediate	
2027	8.0	149.0	2.0	180	86 (42 n + 44 γ)	0.35	Immediate	


• 149°C pulse adequate to qualify detector

- Dose rate >> 10 rad/s criterion
- Pulse width < 1 ms
- Immediate response measured against shutdown trigger

- Same general plan as before,
  - Lower intensity pulse to test equipment connections and performance
  - Only a 150°C pulse needed for qualification
  - New configuration to investigate attenuated response
- 5 detectors tested
  - 2 new detectors
  - 3 existing detectors purchased in 2005
- Data Logging
  - Data logger in control room
  - Output voltage from each detector connected to data logger
  - Contact closure signal from each detector connected to data logger
  - Signal from reactor shutdown acquired
  - Time of burst determined from observation of data

- Configuration for Qualifying
  - Detectors positioned within an arc around the reactor
  - Power supplied to each detector
  - 180 cm above the floor
  - 2 meters from the reactor core centerline
  - NADs and CaF<sub>2</sub>(Mn) dosimeters placed in similar locations
- Investigative Configuration
  - Detectors in reactor anteroom different distances from entrance
  - Two sets of NADs and CaF<sub>2</sub>(Mn) dosimeters placed near detectors





Note: Drawing not to scale


- Schedule
  - Equipment set-up on day 1
  - Prompt pulse on day 2 to confirm detector operability and data connections
  - Prompt pulses of 150°C magnitude on days 3 and 4
- Data measurements
  - Temperature rise from RTDs
  - Reactivity and fission yield determined from relationship with  $\Delta T$
  - Pulse width (FWHM) from PD output trace
  - Dose from relationship with  $\Delta T$  (IER-147)
  - Peak dose rate from total dose integrated over pulse shape (PD output trace)

				-	
Reactivity (¢ above prompt)	ΔT (°C)	Fissions (×10 <sup>16</sup> )	Pulse Width (FWHM) (µs)	Total Absorbed Air Dose <sup>†</sup>	
				Dose (rad)	Dose‡ Rate (krad/s)
3.0	74.7	0.99	196	44	220
8.0	155	2.1	71.6	90	1,300
8.0	153	2.1	67.7		
† Combined gamma and neutron doses					
‡ Estimated from dividing dose by FWHM					

#### 155°C pulse adequate to qualify detector

- Dose rate >> 10 rad/s criterion
- Pulse width < 1 ms
- Detector response measured from detector output and contact closure signal


#### **Typical detector response to a Godiva Burst**



#### **Detector Responses to May 15th 75° Prompt Burst**

74.7° Burst CAAS Response


15-May-2018



25

#### **Detector Responses to May 16th 155° Prompt Burst**


154.5° Burst CAAS Response 16-May-2018



26

#### **Detector Responses from Anteroom - May 17th**

152.9° Burst CAAS Response 17-May-2018



# Conclusion

- Hand calculations can be useful for evaluating detector coverage
- Detector efficiency must be considered when modeling rapid transients
- Re-established DOE capability to test detectors with intense, short-duration mixed neutron and gamma field
- Established confidence that new detectors and existing detectors:
  - Will detect a minimum duration criticality accident
  - Are tolerant to maximum radiation
- Detector response ~20 to 25 ms, mostly due to contact closure in the alarm signal relay
- Lends confidence that the Y-12 CAAS system will generate an alarm signal within <sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> second
- Fielded dosimetry agreed with IER-147 within 25%

### **Acknowledgments**

- DOE NCSP for overall support and funding
- LLNL for planning, dosimetry, and results
- LANL for setting up equipment and operating reactor

#### Disclaimer

This work of authorship and those incorporated herein were prepared by Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) as accounts of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government under Contract DE-NA0001942. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor CNS, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility to any non-governmental recipient hereof for the accuracy, completeness, use made, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency or contractor thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency or contractor (other than the authors) thereof.