







**ANS** Winter Meeting & Expo

2018

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## **Update on the use of Neutron Absorbers for Storage Applications at Y-12**

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#### **Outline**


- Introduction to Y12 and its modern day storage mission
- Storage system used at Y12 and the RCSB
- Neutron absorber system characteristics
- Abnormal event testing and analysis
- Update on 10+ years of use
- Challenges encountered
- Future work

#### What is Y-12?

- WWII Manhattan Project site in Oak Ridge, TN.
- Original mission to enrich uranium for the first atomic weapon
- Later mission to perform lithium separation and provide key components for the thermonuclear weapons that helped end the Cold War.
- Ongoing mission to receive the uranium-based secondaries, which are then disassembled, refurbished and reassembled.
- Y12 has many legacy facilities and is undergoing a decades long transformation effort to consolidate capabilities into new facilities, and also responsibly maintain current facilities.



### What is Y-12?







- Weapons assembly and disassembly
- Life Extension Programs and surveillance for active weapons
- Plutonium pit surveillance
- High explosives components



- Disassembly, refurbishment, and reassembly of canned subassemblies
- Safe, secure uranium storage
- Highly enriched uranium fuel for the United States Navy
- Specialized response training and material recovery to support nonproliferation

#### What is Y-12?

- Highly Enrich Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF)
  - Secure, efficient storage of weapons-grade uranium
  - Larger than a football field construction 2008, operational in 2010
- Uranium Processing Facility (UPF)
  - Under construction, operational in 2025
  - Sustains long-term uranium capabilities



### **ANSI/ANS-8.21 Overview**


- ANSI/ANS-8.21 provides detailed Requirements and Guidance covering important aspects of neutron absorber reliability including:
  - Maintained presence and functionality of neutron absorber system
  - Material accessibility consideration
  - Impact of credible events such as fire, temperature variations, vibrations, mechanical impacts, corrosion, inadvertent removal, depletion, and flooding
  - Validation and modeling techniques
  - Testing and verification methods

## **RCSB** Development Timeline


- Conceptualized as early as 1999 to meet the nation's need to store large quantities of HEU—essentially a nearly infinite neutron system.
  - A.W. Krass, K.D. Lewis, J.J. Lichtenwalter, and D.A. Tollefson, **Comparison of Absorber Material for a Palletized Rack Storage System**, presented at the American Nuclear Society Winter Meeting, Reno, NV, November 11-15, 2001.
  - J.J. Lichtenwalter, D.A. Tollefson, L.E. Johnsen, A.W. Krass, and K.D. Lewis, **Palletized Rack Storage System Absorber Material Testing**, presented at the American Nuclear Society Winter Meeting, Reno, NV, November 11-15, 2001.
  - A.W. Krass, J.J. Lichtenwalter, D.A. Tollefson, and K.J. Carroll, A Practical Application of a Fixed Neutron Poison for High Capacity HEU Storage, presented at The American Nuclear Society Summer Meeting, Hollywood, Fl, June 9-13, 2002.
- Rackable Can Storage Box (RCSB) constructed and tested in 2001, and deployed as early as 2008.
- HEUMF complete and loaded with RCSBs in 2010.

## **RCSB** Description

- 3' x 4' x 1' block assembly on a 6" tall skid assembly
- Block has 567kg of solid ceramic material with 6 cavity positions, and 90 kg stainless steel body with 17 kg lid
- Skid is made of 72 kg stainless steel
- Positions are designed to receive one metal can each with up to 20kg loading
- Cans may have variable dimensions and must be loaded with material forms that are stable and suitable for long term storage



## **RCSB Description**





- The solid ceramic material is a crystalline matrix of MgKPO<sub>4</sub>•6H<sub>2</sub>0 with distributions of:
  - natB<sub>4</sub>C to provide neutron absorption properties
  - Class F Fly-Ash added for set control and strength
- MgO (powder) + KH<sub>2</sub>PO<sub>4</sub> (powder) + 5H<sub>2</sub>O (liquid) → MgKPO<sub>4</sub>·6H<sub>2</sub>O (solid)
- The solution-slurry is poured into an inverted RCSB stainless steel body and allowed to harden
- The stoichiometric amount of H<sub>2</sub>O necessary for full water saturation is used in the mix – however, excess water that escapes after solidification has been observed

Constituent	Proportion (wt%)
Water in liquid phase (H <sub>2</sub> O)	21.1
Monopotassium Phosphate (KH <sub>2</sub> PO <sub>4</sub> )	31.9
Boric Acid (H <sub>3</sub> BO <sub>3</sub> )	1.0
Magnesium Oxide (MgO)	10.4
Fly Ash	31.1
Boron Carbide (B <sub>4</sub> C)	4.5
Total	100.0











Photo curtesy of Ceradyne, Inc.

- Samples are generated from the same batch of solution slurry and undergo testing
  - Density
  - Compression
  - Neutron absorption
- The boron additives with chemically bound water in solid ceramic material provide a robust fixed medium that can be credited for its neutron absorbing properties
- Loss of water is a concern
  - Yearly surveillance performed to ensure no more than 50lb gross weight loss
  - No significant water loss has been measured




## Fire Scenario involving RCSBs

- Thermal analysis of RCSB using two dimensional finite element model
- Design basis fire at HEUMF
  - 47 min, max temp of 1491°F
- Examine temperature penetration profile
- Results show that at deeper than 2 inches, temperatures remain below 212°F



## Fire Scenario involving RCSBs



 NCS models with up to 2" of "dehydrated" ceramic on sides and cavities

Description	Single Unit K <sub>eff</sub>	Large Array K <sub>eff</sub>
20 kg metal 0" dehydrated	0.80611	0.86382
20 kg metal 1" dehydrated	0.79689	0.86701
20 kg metal 2" dehydrated	0.79443	0.89262
20 kg metal full dehydrated	0.79893	1.09493

## **Vibrations and Mechanical Impacts**

 Recent drop test of RCSBs pulled from the field completed, continues to perform well and retain its loading.






























## **Update on 10+ Years of RCSBs**

- The loaded RCSBs in place at HEUMF have rested in static storage for many years with very little excitement, successfully meeting the long term storage mission
- The use of RCSBs has changed substantially at Y-12 from the original storage of high-equity materials
  - Loading of cans into RCSBs directly at a processing facility
  - Transport of loaded RCSBs on the Special Nuclear Material Vehicles
  - Intermediate storage of empty and loaded RCSBs outside of the HEUMF
  - Receipt of material from other DOE sites, and even across the world, that is loaded into RCSBs
  - Storage of low equity Y-12 materials.

## Challenges encountered


- The nature of verifying and qualifying each RCSB makes for a laborious quality assurance process, and procuring additional RCSBs takes substantial resources
- The direct-to-storage approach of many offsite shipment receipts has made for limited RCSB utilization
- Unreacted water from the solid ceramic material has been observed to have leaked from RCSBs over time
- Some fissile materials that have been loaded in RCSBs have raised concerns over certain material properties, like ignitability or expandability
- The ability of the RCSB to resist heat from reaching the cavities is largely unknown


#### **Future work**

- Further testing of the RCSB may be beneficial by demonstrating its performance in certain scenarios of interest.
  - Furnace Testing and/or additional thermal modeling
  - Additional Drop Testing
- Minor design changes may be beneficial to reduce the amount or impact of unreacted water or water loss
  - Use less water in the manufacturing process
  - Lids and bolts could be improved with seals to resist water entry from external sources
- A new design for larger loadings to support UPF missions

#### **Future work**

 A new design with more cavities, but a smaller diameter, that would allow for more cans that have lower fissile loadings





# **Questions?**



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